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Testing the Myths of Transition: Was Estonia Following the 
Shock Therapy Model and Slovenia Following the Gradualist 
Model in 1991-2000?
Viljar Veebel,* Andra Namm & Taavi Tillmann
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to conduct an exploratory analysis of factors that might explain the cross-national 
variations in the level tax morality across the European Union. In order to do this, three competing 
explanations for the cross-national variations in tax morality will be evaluated which variously view 
lower levels of tax morality to be a result of either: under-development (a modernisation explanation); 
high taxes, state corruption and too much state interference (a neo-liberal explanation), or too little 
state redistribution and intervention to protect citizens (a structuralist explanation). Evaluating the 
cross-national variations in tax morality reported in a 2007 Eurobarometer survey using multi level 
econometric techniques, the ﬁ nding is that the tax morality of a baseline European citizen is higher in 
more developed and less corrupt nations and in countries with higher levels of taxation, social protection 
and redistribution. The outcome is a call for a synthesis of the three explanations in the form of a new 
neo-modernisation explanation which, contrary to neo-liberal discourse, argues that developed nations 
with higher levels of taxation, greater levels of social protection and higher levels of redistribution have 
higher levels of tax morality. The tentative policy implications are then discussed.
Keywords: informal economy, tax morality, taxation, neo-liberalism, social Europe.
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union, including both the former Soviet republics and its socialist satellites 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), from Estonia to Slovenia oﬀ ered a unique challenge and a need 
for system-wide economic and social transitions. It also oﬀ ered a possibility of testing and evaluating 
diﬀ erent theoretical models of transition from radical shock therapy to gradualism in practice. Estonia 
and Slovenia, while being similar in many aspects (two small states in the CEE, both former members 
of an authoritarian federal union, both regaining independence in 1991 and both joining the European 
Union (EU) in 2004, both later becoming members of the Eurozone and the Schengen Area), have often 
symbolised two opposite approaches and reform paths in terms of transition processes, with Estonia 
representing the shock therapy model and Slovenia representing the gradualist model.
This article aims at analysing to what extent the reform paths undertaken in these two countries 
match the theoretical criteria of the models they are supposed to represent and symbolise. One may 
ask, why open this old debate again in the year 2014?
The recent Eurozone ﬁ nancial crisis has once again made both countries face choices – whether 
to achieve ﬁ scal consolidation with the gradual adjustment or with the shock therapy model. History 
seems to repeat itself, as Estonia has once again selected the model of austerity and shock therapy, 
while Slovenia has once again opted for gradualism. Accordingly, existing socio-economic experiences 
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may create path-dependence and form a supportive basis for similar choices in the future, which 
makes it even more important to research whether Estonia and Slovenia actually were following the 
transition paths that they have come to symbolise after regaining their independence.
Following research is also important as it focuses on the varieties of successful modernisation and 
democratisation models in the small states of CEE, which produces the basis of experience needed for 
the next wave of transition countries and helps to adjust the existing theoretical models.
The present research has two central goals, closely interlinked to each other. The ﬁ rst task is to 
analyse how the reform paths undertaken by Estonian and Slovenia correspond to the theoretical 
concepts of ‘shock therapy’ and ‘gradualism’. The second task is to evaluate the ability of the 
theoretical models to correctly allocate the classical country examples to the shock therapy and 
gradualist models and oﬀ er suggestions to improve existing theoretical approaches. This research 
study is also interested in which are the advantages and disadvantages of the polarised approach to 
transition theory models.
Context and debate: models of transition from shock therapy to gradualism
The ‘models of transition’ framework has been the dominant theoretical and analytical approach used 
in 1991-2010 to analyse the transition processes in the CEE (Balcerowicz, 1995; Dewatripont & Roland, 
1992; Lipton & Sachs, 1990; Marangos, 2005b). The main strength of this framework is in providing 
readers with a simple conceptual axis that they can use to compare and contrast the countries in 
the transition process. This practical separation of opinion into two opposing schools of thought has 
inﬂ uenced a similar separation of academic opinion into (at least) two opposing schools of thought. 
Following this inertia, the academic ‘models of transition’ framework attempts to group various 
transitioning countries together on the basis of similarities in how they reformed key elements 
of their economy. These models can be lined up linearly on an axis, with the quickest reformers 
on the one extreme and the slowest reformers on the other extreme. Speed was the main variable 
diﬀ erentiating the two models. Shock therapy supporters believed reforms should be implemented as 
fast as possible (Lipton & Sachs, 1990; Balcerowicz, 1995). Lipton and Sachs, two leading theorists in 
support of shock therapy, argued that reform in one area would support the eﬀ ectiveness of reform 
in another area in an interactive manner (Lipton & Sachs, 1990, p. 99). This provided them with a 
theoretical basis that would show shock therapy to be more eﬀ ective than gradualism. Gradualism 
was developed as a criticism of the shock therapy model and believed that the sequencing of reforms 
and slower implementation would be more beneﬁ cial for the country in transition. In parallel, an 
actual active transition process in the CEE was already gaining speed in 1989-1991 and was contributing 
both in terms of terminology and ‘best practices’. From a theoretical perspective, the Polish transition 
experiences with shock therapy principles and methods became especially valuable.
A major step forward in the evolution of transition framework models was taken by John Marangos, 
who developed ﬁ ve diﬀ erent models of transitions, incorporating a political dimension in the reforms, 
as well as making at least a passing reference to the importance of institutional reform. Marangos’ 
models of transitions were based on the excessive oversimpliﬁ cations created by the previous models 
(Marangos, 2005b). Marangos tried to bring more variety but also more simplicity into the debate by 
creating his so-called primary and secondary elements of transition to incorporate political aspects 
alongside economic ones.
Actual experiences from the CEE and especially from Poland, however, did not ﬁ nd suﬃ  cient 
reﬂ ection in Marangos’ model. As a result, his criteria in some categories were either oversimpliﬁ ed 
or the benchmarks were set to be so demanding (e.g. privatisation speed and scope or liberalisation 
of salaries) that they were not met by any of the CEE states during their ﬁ rst decade of transition. 
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Based on socio-economic variables, Marangos classiﬁ ed ﬁ ve diﬀ erent transition models: 1) the 
shock therapy transition model; 2) the neoclassical gradualist model; 3) the post-Keynesian transition 
model; 4) the pluralist market socialist transition model; 5) the non-pluralistic market socialist model. 
These 5 models are an amalgamation of three diﬀ erent views of economic analysis, two diﬀ erent speeds 
of implementing the reforms and two diﬀ erent political structures (Marangos, 2005b, p. 308).  The models 
are diﬀ erentiated by speciﬁ c elements (criteria) of reforms (e.g. privatisation).  The following research 
will focus on testing models one (the shock therapy transition model) and two (the neoclassical 
gradualist model).
The shock therapy model is a neoclassical model of transition advocating the immediate 
implement ation of the necessary reforms to establish a free market economy (Marangos, 2007, p. 
89). Diﬀ erently from earlier shock therapy models, Marangos’ deﬁ nition of shock therapy lists 16 
diﬀ erent reforms that need to be completed to transform the state into a capitalist one. These reforms 
are divided into seven subcategories: 1) decisive and full price liberalisation; 2) fast privatisation; 3) 
gradual institutional development; 4) strict monetary policy; 5) balanced ﬁ scal policy; 6) liberalised 
inter national trade; and 7) limited social policy and social security.
Under the decisive and fast liberalisation of state controls on prices, the shock therapy model 
argues that all controls for prices should be removed within the ﬁ rst year. Income policy (i.e. wage 
controls and minimum wages) should be liberal during the whole period. 
Privatisation of all state companies should be started and ﬁ nished within year one. A mixture 
of methods should be used to facilitate speedy privatisation, including: a) restitution, returning the 
property to the rightful previous owner from the time prior to collectivization; b) auctions, selling to 
highest bidder; and c) vouchers and free distribution of shares to workers. 
A broad range of institutions have to be established in order for the transition to proceed smoothly. 
Initially, these include taxes and a regulatory and legal framework to govern business life, such as 
contract, private property, and trade law. Halfway through the transition, institutional reforms should 
also be carried out by strengthening competition policy, bankruptcy law, corporate governance, and 
the wider regulation of ﬁ nance and the infrastructure. The shock therapy model advocates for these 
institutions to be developed gradually by market forces as opposed to being state-driven. 
Monetary policy should establish an independent central bank during year one. Hard budget 
constraints should be used from year one. If a government owned or private company faces a crisis 
with a large debt, then the government should not bail them out (Marangos, 2006, p. 144).  
Fiscal policy should ensure that budget deﬁ cits are reduced and year one sees the replacement of 
corporate taxes by VAT and a ﬂ at-rate income tax. A pegged exchange rate should be switched to a 
ﬂ oating exchange rate after 1-2 years. 
International trade should be as liberal as possible, whereas all tariﬀ s and quotas should be 
removed within two years. 
The social policy needs to oﬀ er a limited safety net to those who temporarily cannot participate 
in the job market, and beneﬁ ts should be short-term. Welfare and other social services should be 
provided by a mixture of public and private providers.  
The neoclassical gradualist model (interchangeably called ‘gradualism’ in this article) has the 
central idea To establish economic, institutional, political and ideological structures before any attempt 
at liberalization. These were needed in order to be able to build a competitive market capitalist system in 
a stable and secure fashion for society that did not create too much disorder (Marangos, 2005a, p. 264).
Marangos’ gradualist model lists 17 central reforms, which are further divided into seven sub-
categories: 1) gradual and limited price liberalisation; 2) slow and gradual privatisation; 3) gradual and 
natural institutional development; 4) gradual and balanced monetary policy; 5) balanced and neutral 
ﬁ scal policy; 6) slow liberalisation of international trade; 7) social policy with a large safety net. 
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Prices should be controlled in the beginning of the transition for about seven years before 
liberalisation. Wage regulations should be removed by the 10th year of transition. Gradual privatisation 
should be exercised primarily through the public auction method. Institutions regulating market 
relations should be developed in an organic, voluntary manner by a joint eﬀ ort between market and 
state forces. Monetary policy should establish hard budget constraints and an independent central 
bank during year three. Fiscal policy should ensure that budget deﬁ cits are reduced and year two sees 
the replacement of corporate taxes by VAT and a ﬂ at-rate income tax. A ﬂ oating exchange rate should 
be established in year 9. Trade tariﬀ s should be supported during the ﬁ rst eight years of the transition 
and reduced thereafter. Conditional foreign aid and credit should be used during the whole transition 
process. A social policy with the medium-wide social safety net has to be available for all groups but 
for a limited time. Private providers should join in providing welfare services from the third year of 
transition. 
The methodology, criteria and test countries
The test cases, Estonia and Slovenia in the period of 1991-2000, were chosen based on their reputations 
as being the symbolic countries to represent the following transition models. Slovenia has been debated 
within the framework of a gradualist approach by Mencinger, Roland and Marangos (Mencinger, 2004, 
pp. 67-83; Roland, 2000, p. 14; Marangos, 2005a, p. 287). Estonia is seen as representing the shock 
therapy model by White and Sachs (White, 2007, p. 57; Sachs, 1995, p. 11). Slovenia and Estonia have 
not only been considered the extreme cases, but also the success stories (Slovenia until 2008) of 
the transition process. Something both cases also had in common, was the need to start reforms 
as a member of an authoritarian federal state, which set numerous special limitations to the speed 
and scope of actual reform packages. Of course, in many aspects Estonia and Slovenia had diﬀ erent 
socio-economic starting points in 1991, as Slovenia was an open economy with a functioning product 
market and a functioning though rather speciﬁ c labour market before the transition, while Estonia 
was a part of the Soviet Union´s planned economy.
The two countries also range quite diﬀ erently on scales of economic liberties calculated by 
institutions such as the Heritage Foundation or the Fraser Institute. Estonia, clearly leading on the 
scales of the two institutions, is supposed to be more liberal than most of the EU countries, while 
Slovenia has been on the bottom of the scoreboard not only among newcomers but also among all 
the EU countries. The previously described diﬀ erences, of course, will set some additional limitations 
to conclusions, but do not reduce the overall value of the research.
A 10-year timeframe for the test period is chosen according to the suggestion of John Marangos, 
who states that his models have a 10-year timeframe to describe and illustrate the sequencing of 
reforms.  Therefore, the years 1991-2000 were classed as representing years 1-10 in Marangos’ model. 
The criteria and elements to test whether Estonia and Slovenia represent the ideals of theoretical 
models were developed based on central components of the shock therapy model and the gradualist 
model. By combining the studies of Sachs (1995), Stiglitz (2002), Dewatripont and Roland (1992) and 
Marangos (2002, 2006 and 2007), speciﬁ c elements of reforms for evaluation and testing were selected.
The evaluation model is qualitative, each reform element is compared to its ideal model and to 
its opposite model (i.e. the null hypothesis), and the judgment is made as to whether the case: a) 
follows the model fully or closely; b) deviates slightly from the model (i.e. if 25-50% of the model’s 
prescriptions have been contravened); or c) deviates signiﬁ cantly from the model (i.e. if more than 
50% of the prescriptions have been contravened). 
The assessment will be conducted with combined methodology where, ﬁ rst, a quantitative analysis 
will calculate the existence and duration of actual reforms conducted in test countries and, second, a 
qualitative analysis will evaluate in which level reforms in test countries matched the descriptions of 
ideal models and opposite models. 
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In qualitative analysis, the ﬁ rst level analysis score will reﬂ ect to what degree the empirical case 
under study matches the theoretical model in comparison. For the sake of simplicity, signiﬁ cant 
deviations will be annulled with a weight of zero. Slight deviations will be discounted at 50%, and 
matches will be given 100% weighting when entering the overall score.
The second level analysis ‘percentage match to the model’ score will be calculated based on 
alternative weights for each of the three categories. Signiﬁ cant deviations are given a small weight of 
25%. Slight deviations are discounted at 62.5%, and matches are weighted at 87.5%.
The third level analysis will be performed on 14 reform elements. Each reform element is rated 
independently by asking, Does this reform element correctly identify that Estonia looks more like shock 
therapy, and Slovenia more like gradualism? (scored +1), or Does this reform element make Estonia look 
more like gradualism and Slovenia more like shock therapy? (Scored -1). If the reform element cannot 
separate the two countries, a weight of 0 is given. In each calculation level, two types of results will 
be calculated: ﬁ rst, in which level the reform paths undertaken by Estonia and Slovenia followed the 
theoretical concepts of ‘shock therapy’ and ‘gradualism’, the models they are supposed to symbolise 
in theoretical debates. Second, evaluating the ability of the theoretical models to correctly diversify 
the classical country examples to the shock therapy and gradualist models.
Estonia’s choices of transition: how close are they to the ideals of shock therapy?
In case of Estonia, seven categories of reforms were mapped and analysed:
1) decisive and full price liberalisation;
2) fast privatisation;
3) gradual institutional development;
4) strict monetary policy;
5) balanced ﬁ scal policy;
6) liberalised international trade; and
7) limited social policy.
Marangos’ shock therapy model expects the removal of all controls and regulations on prices 
within the ﬁ rst year of transition. Wages should be driven by market forces, as opposed to being 
set by the state. Marangos’ explanations do not deﬁ ne measurable criteria for market-driven wage 
policy. In its radical form, it could mean the absence of all wage controls, including the removal of 
minimum wages, even if most of the transition countries kept some legal minimum wage levels. 
Therefore, a more practical deﬁ nition for testing would be the removal of complex wage controls and 
the establishment of a relatively low minimum wage (i.e. less than 40% of the average median wage). 
Estonia started its ﬁ rst steps towards price liberalisation in 1989, when prices on many products 
were allowed to ﬂ oat (Staehr, 2004, p. 41). By the ﬁ rst half of 1992, the majority of price liberalisation 
had been completed (Gillies, Leimann, & Peterson, 2002, p. 178; Brown, 1993, pp. 494-495; de Melo, 
Denizer, Gelb, Tenev, & Tenev, 1996, p. 38). A year later, only publicly provided housing, electricity and 
heating prices were controlled by the state (Staehr, 2004, p. 44.). Therefore, by 1992 most of the price 
liberalisation reform was completed. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] 
data suggests that Estonia liberalised prices fully already by 1993 (European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development [EBRD], 2003). To summarise, price liberalisation took approximately 3-4 years to 
complete, marking a slight deviation from the 1-year prescription of the shock therapy model. 
In terms of wage policy, Estonia followed the shock therapy model closely. State-directed wage 
decrees were removed within the ﬁ rst year. The minimum wage was lowered from 37% of the average 
wage in 1992 to 25% of the average wage in 1995. Thereafter, the minimum wage was slowly raised to 
29% by 2002 (Hinnosaar, 2003, p. 329). In comparative terms, Estonia’s minimum wage was among the 
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lowest of all the transitioning countries, low enough for it to remain practically irrelevant at the time 
of high inﬂ ation in 1993-1995 (Noorkõiv, Orazem, Puur, & Vodopivec, 1997, p. 21). Even by 1999, EBRD 
was still commenting that Wages had very little regulation. Although the minimum wage was set, no 
real wage regulation existed in 1999 (EBRD, 1999, p. 216). Therefore, Estonia’s wage liberalisation policy 
closely followed the shock therapy model. 
In terms of privatisation, speed is seen as a more important variable than the scope and speciﬁ c 
methods used during privatisation. Restitution, auctions and vouchers could all be used, provided 
that the process aims to ﬁ nish within 12 months. In Estonia, the privatisation process took much 
longer, approximately 5-7 years (1992-1996- 1998), to reach the criteria of 90% of non-infrastructure 
companies being privatised (Terk, 2000, p. 158). This is reﬂ ected in EBRD data, which gives a maximum 
rating of 4.3 for small-scale privatisation by 1996 (EBRD, 1998, p. 216). Large-scale privatisation never 
reached their 4.3 criterion (EBRD Transition Report, 2005, p. 128). This may again be related to the 
treatment of infrastructure or utility companies, as the Estonian state continued to administer the 
Tallinn Harbour and the national electricity company (Staehr, 2004, p. 40). This analysis shows that 
1998 marks the end of large-scale privatisation and large-scale asset transfer, as after this year the 
number and size of deals fell signiﬁ cantly, culminating with the closure of the Estonian Privatisation 
Agency three years later. To conclude, ﬁ rst level privatisation was relatively rapid and overwhelming, 
taking just four years to complete. However, the ﬁ nal stage of privatisation was relatively gradual, 
taking 6 years to complete. As these two phases were staggered over a 7-year period, it is diﬃ  cult to 
view the privatisation process as ‘rapid’, when compared to the 1-year criterion used in shock therapy 
and, therefore, the example diﬀ ers signiﬁ cantly from the theoretical model. Evaluating whether 
the privatisation process in Estonia was fast enough to be classiﬁ ed as shock therapy is the most 
problematic issue. The conclusions in terms of privatisation depend on the reference basis – whether 
Estonia is compared with the rest of the CEE reformers or whether its ability is be matched with 
Marangos’ criteria. While Estonia was one of the most radical in terms of privatisation speed and 
scope in the CEE, it did not meet the shock therapy criteria of Marangos’ concept. Accordingly, it is 
the authors’ opinion that in this aspect Marangos’ model needs some adjustments, as it is setting 
excessively high evaluation standards for states in the former Soviet bloc.
With regards to the method of transfer, direct sales (by tender with preliminary negotiations) were 
the primary method for privatisation and auctioning the second most common one (EBRD, 1998, p. 
32). This again deviates from the shock therapy prescription of multiple methods, and therefore the 
Estonian case is more similar to the gradualist method. The 7-year timescale of privatisation in Estonia 
also resembles the 8-year timescale in the gradualist model. 
However, contrary to the gradualist model wherein restructuration should take place prior to 
privatisation, restructuration was signiﬁ cantly slower in Estonia. Throughout 1993-2000, EBRD rated 
Estonia’s corporate governance and restructuration as a ﬂ at 3.0 with no progress. Only in 2001 was 
this raised, possibly on account of the upcoming restructuration of the already privatised oil shale 
companies (Brendow, 2003, p. 308). Therefore, although privatisation in Estonia was more similar to 
gradualism than shock therapy, both theories deviated signiﬁ cantly from the actual events in Estonia. 
Estonia can be described as an exemplary country where privatisation happened relatively fast (Terk, 
1999, p. 140), ‘supporting’ the shock therapy model. 
The shock therapy model supports the gradual creation of institutions by spontaneous market 
institutions when the time seems appropriate for the market (Marangos, 2007, p. 108). The state should 
not intervene, but rather allow the markets to form their own institutions. Estonia’s government set 
up the initial pro-market institutions relatively quickly. Barry Lesser asserts that once the markets 
had been liberalised, the recognition followed that the government had an increasing role to play 
in preventing market failures and abuse, and regulating their activity with new institutions (Lesser, 
2000, p. 2). Thus, the competition law and policy were introduced already in 1993 (Rindzeviciute, 2004, 
p. 50). The inﬂ uence of external bodies on institutional reform continued with the WB and WTO. An 
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Estonian Memorandum of Economic Policies (1992, Point 49) states that: The Government recognises 
that there are weaknesses in the present institutional framework for monitoring economic developments 
and evaluating and coordinating policy. To aﬀ ect rapid improvement, an inter-ministerial commission, 
which would also include participation by the World Bank, was established in June 1992, reporting to the 
Prime Minister (Memorandum of Economic Policies, 1992).
Similarly, the ﬁ ve years of negotiating with the WTO allowed the WTO to advise on several law 
changes, adopt new laws, and undertake new obligations. It is diﬃ  cult to disentangle the market 
inﬂ uences from the state inﬂ uences in these instances, as the two had become closely collaborative. 
In terms of economic industrial relations, Feldmann stresses that: Market-based forces have been 
pivotal in shaping institutional policy (Feldmann, 2006, p. 829), such as in shaping the comparatively 
regressive tax system.
To summarise, formal institutional reform was a large and important part of the Estonian 
transition. This was shaped partly by market forces, partly by state forces, and partly by international 
forces. Therefore, it deviates to some extent from the shock therapy model. 
The shock therapy model advocates hard budgetary constraints (Marangos, 2007, p. 110). Hobdari, 
Jones and Mygind (2009) have pointed out how the existence of soft budget constraints on Estonian 
businesses during 1993-2002 decreased the probability that investment was ﬁ nancially constrained, 
but there is no consensus on this question. This is an unexpected and positive outcome that represents 
a slight deviation from the shock therapy model. Hard budget constraints were imposed on the 
public sector and private enterprises, and a ‘no bailout’ policy was enforced for ﬁ nancial institutions 
(Elenurm, 2004, p. 370). Therefore, it is possible that these predominantly hard budget constraints 
were in eﬀ ect throughout most of the transition. This deviates slightly from the shock therapy model, 
as well as the gradualist model, which both advocated hard constraints from the 1st and 3rd year 
onwards, respectively. 
While the Eesti Pank, the central bank of the republic of Estonia, was established in 1989, it gained 
its formal independence only in 1993 (Staehr, 2004, p. 50), when the national currency was introduced. 
Even if partial independence a year earlier were acceptable, it still would not fully meet the criteria 
of Marangos. In summary, analysis shows that Estonia deviated signiﬁ cantly from the shock therapy 
model of central banking. 
In terms of ﬁ scal and tax policy, the shock therapy model advocated for reducing budget deﬁ cits, 
a regressive tax system in which corporate taxes would be replaced by VAT within one year, and a ﬂ at-
rate income tax level (Marangos, 2007, p. 112).  In 1990 and 1991, government budgets were in surplus 
(Estonian Memorandum of Economic Policies, 1992). Most of this was achieved by maintaining a light 
state with restraints on taxation and expenditure (Estonian Memorandum of Economic Policies, 1995). 
During 1999-2001, Estonia experienced a minor budget deﬁ cit (3.5% of GDP), which was neutralised in 
subsequent years. To summarise, although Estonian governments through the decades have taken the 
budget deﬁ cit issue more seriously than anywhere else in Europe, a short lapse in 1999-2001 marks a 
slight deviation from the formal shock therapy model. 
Estonian tax reform took much longer. At ﬁ rst, Estonia created a progressive income tax system 
with diﬀ erent tax brackets. This system lasted until 1994 when the ﬂ at tax rate was established 
(Pomerants, 1998, p. 55). A corporate tax was also established, and at ﬁ rst it was progressive but later 
it was changed to a ﬂ at rate of 35% (Hansson, 1993, p. 8). Therefore, in terms of tax structure, the 
Estonian example diﬀ ers signiﬁ cantly from the shock therapy model; in terms of time, it diﬀ ers due to 
ﬂ uctuations and the limited degree of reform that took place during the transition period. 
According to the shock therapy model, international trade should be as liberal and non-regulated 
as possible. The shock therapy model covers three main areas: the use of either a pegged or ﬁ xed 
exchange rate (as opposed to a ﬂ oating exchange rate), tariﬀ s, and conditional foreign aid. Initially, 
a ﬁ xed exchange rate is preferred at the beginning of transformation, and after one or two years a 
ﬂ exible rate should be established instead (Marangos, 2007, p. 113). Any restrictions on foreign trade, 
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such as tariﬀ s or quotas, should not exist and be removed within the ﬁ rst two years of transition. For 
the third domain, conditional foreign aid should be encouraged, and the country should also join the 
IMF, WB and WTO. (Marangos, 2007, pp. 113-114). 
Contrary to IMF recommendations, Estonia established its own currency (the kroon) on the 20th 
of June, 1992, making it the ﬁ rst country in Former Soviet Union to do so. The Estonian kroon had a 
ﬁ xed exchange rate pegged to the German deutsche mark, therefore, at no point did Estonia use the 
ﬂ exible exchange rate prescribed in the ideal shock therapy model. 
In terms of tariﬀ s, Estonia started to abolish these very early in the transition process. In the ﬁ rst 
half of 1992, tariﬀ s revenues made up only 1.2% of government income (Hansson, 1993, p. 4). By 1993, 
all remaining tariﬀ s were removed and soon thereafter non-tariﬀ  restrictions were also removed 
(EBRD, 1999, p. 214). By 1995 almost all non-tariﬀ  restrictions on foreign trade were removed (Estonian 
Memorandum of Economic Policies, 1995), and Estonia had established some of the most liberal trade 
and investment laws to be found anywhere (Sakkeus, 1998, p. 19). 
Reforms went so far that by 2000 Estonia had to re-establish some of its tariﬀ s, in order to be 
considered for membership of the EU (Rindzeviciute, 2004, p. 44). Therefore, the ﬁ rst 9 years of 
transition followed the shock therapy model, after which post-transition developments forced it to 
reverse course slightly. However, during the pre-EU accession transition process, Estonia followed the 
shock therapy model in terms of tariﬀ s almost perfectly. 
The shock therapy model expects that a social safety net should be narrow and only created 
for those who, for whatever reason, cannot participate in the job market. Such aid should be given 
out only in the short-term, in order to avoid dependence (Marangos, 2002, p. 62). The main social 
programs in Estonia included extensive maternity leave, child beneﬁ ts, free education (primary, 
secondary and, to some degree, tertiary), universal free healthcare, universal pension and disability 
allowance (Rindzeviciute, 2004, p. 51). The system consists of many diﬀ erent safety nets; however, 
these are not too generous. For example, the duration of Estonian unemployment beneﬁ ts in 2000 
was 9-12 months, compared to the EU average of 6-60 months. Furthermore, Estonia has notably low 
minimum wages, unemployment beneﬁ ts and state pensions. The minimum wage was eﬀ ectively so 
low that it never inﬂ uenced the decisions to hire new people, as eﬀ ective wages were always higher 
than minimum wage (Veebel & Loik, 2012). 
Moreover, this partial safety net was not put in place within the ﬁ rst year, but was created and 
reformed many times during the transition period (e.g. unemployment beneﬁ ts reform in 2002. 
Therefore, Estonia deviates signiﬁ cantly from the shock therapy model.
To conclude: out of a total of 15 reform items in Estonia, eight deviated signiﬁ cantly from the 
shock therapy model, four deviated slightly and three reform items matched the shock therapy model. 
A corresponding comparison of 16 Estonian reforms using the gradualist model showed that nine 
reform items deviated signiﬁ cantly, four deviated slightly and three matched the model. 
This suggests that the Estonian case did not reﬂ ect the shock therapy model particularly well, 
however, did it not reﬂ ect the gradualist model particularly well either.  
Slovenia’s choices of transition: how close were they to the ideals 
of the gradualist model?
In the case of Slovenia, where the gradualist model is evaluated, the following reform elements were 
selected for analysis:
1) gradual and limited price and wage liberalisation;
2) slow and gradual privatisation;
3) gradual and natural institutional development;
4) gradual and balanced monetary policy;
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5) balanced and neutral ﬁ scal policy;
6) slow and gradual liberalisation of international trade and foreign aid; and
7) social policy with a large safety network.
The neoclassical gradualist model suggests that prices should be controlled by the state at the 
beginning of the transition for about seven years, after which time the state should gradually start 
to remove controls over prices (Marangos, 2006, p. 141). At the beginning of transition, prices for 
basic food, energy and utilities deﬁ nitely have to be controlled by the state (Marangos, 2005a, p. 
269). Marangos’ model suggests that this should happen within two years, more precisely from 
years 7 to 9 after the start of the transition. In terms of wage regulation, gradualists supported wage 
controls during the ﬁ rst nine years of the transition, after which the market should slowly step in and 
determine wage levels without state interference (Marangos, 2005a, p. 270).
Slovenia began its price liberalisation before the start of the oﬃ  cial transition (Avolio, 1995, p. 3). 
In 1987, about 40% of prices had been liberalised. Slovenia then liberalised most of its prices between 
1988 and 1989 (Sachs & Pleskovic, 1994, pp. 196-197). However, when Slovenia began its work towards 
being accepted as a future EU Member State in 1997, it had to further liberalise its prices as its previous 
eﬀ orts were not seen as being extensive enough. EBRD summarised how state-controlled prices still 
accounted for 28% of the retail price index and 20% of the consumer price index (EBRD, 1998, p. 190). 
This suggests that Slovenia had liberalised most of its prices by 1989, but about a quarter remained 
under state control until 1997. This deviates signiﬁ cantly from the gradualist prescription. 
In terms of wage policy, Slovenia froze its nominal wages for six months at the start of the 
transition program, signalling its tendency to regulate wages in the future. A series of reports by the 
EBRD between 1998-2004 indicate that wage regulations still took place in Slovenia during the ﬁ rst 9 
years of transition (as per the model) but also in the years thereafter (slight deviation from the model) 
(EBRD, 2004, p. 180).
Gradualists support slow and gradual privatisation over approximately eight years; this is achieved 
by way of auctions that sell assets to the highest bidder (Marangos, 2006, p. 143). Selling of small and 
medium size companies should be done quickly, during the third year of the transition, and should 
be completed within 12 months. Before the privatisation of large enterprises, such companies should 
ﬁ rst be restructured within the ﬁ rst 3-9 years of the transition process (Marangos, 2005a, p. 275). After 
restructuring, each large enterprise should be sold. The entire process should be ﬁ nished within one 
year by the end of year ten (Marangos, 2005a, p. 285).
The privatisation process had already begun under Yugoslavia, when the ﬁ rst privatisation laws 
were passed that allowed companies to transfer capital to private hands (Smith, Cin, & Vodopivec, 
1997, p. 163). Slovenia used two diﬀ erent privatisation methods: with small and medium sized 
companies, internal buyout was the preferred method, while bigger companies combined public 
auctions with the internal distribution of shares (Mencinger, 2006, p. 10). This mix of methods means 
that Slovenia did not follow the neoclassical gradualist prescription of preferring the auction method 
for all enterprises.
EBRD data (EBRD, 1999) conﬁ rms that small enterprise privatisation had already begun before 
the oﬃ  cial transition period. In 1989, Slovenia had already received a rating of 3.0 (‘substantial 
share privatised and comprehensive program almost ready for implementation’). This predates the 
gradualist prescription by 4 years. Small-scale privatisation reached 4.0 (‘complete privatisation of 
small companies’) by 1993 according to the EBRD data (EBRD, 1999). Therefore, small-scale privatisation 
took a total of 5 years, signiﬁ cantly longer than the 1 year suggested by the model.
In terms of large enterprises, initial sales began already in 1993 (EBRD rating 2.0). By 1997, 25% had 
been sold, but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate governance (rating 3.0) (EBRD, 
1999). The rating had not increased by 2012, suggesting that large-scale privatisation is still incomplete. 
Accordingly, there is a signiﬁ cant deviation from the model in starting the process 7 years earlier and 
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in not ﬁ nishing the process quickly. In terms of restructuring companies prior to privatisation, this 
too was minimal (Hannula, 2000). This suggests that signiﬁ cant restructuration took place in the 1997-
2000 period; at least three years after large-scale privatisation began. 
When it comes to these criteria, the authors oppose Marangos’ logic, which is supported by the 
Slovenian experience, since on the one hand it is not logical to expect privatisation of large companies 
during one year, and on the other hand it is also not logical to qualify privatisation that lasts 20 years 
as a sign of shock therapy. On the contrary, this means that Slovenia privatised even more gradually 
than suggested in the model.
Under the neoclassical gradualist theory, institutions should be created in a joint collaborative 
fashion between market and state forces. The process should be gradual, natural, organic and voluntary 
as opposed to top-down, allowing for the dissolution of ineﬀ ective institutions and the evolutionary 
strengthening of eﬀ ective institutions (Kolodko, 2000, p. 274, Kornai, 1992, p. 160). The development of 
formal and informal institutions should take place throughout the whole transition period (Marangos, 
2005a, pp. 276-279).
According to Sachs and Pleskovic, Slovenia had already begun to reform its institutional structure 
before the formal transition period started. For example, the Privatisation Agency and the Development 
Fund were established by the state in 1990 (Sachs & Pleskovic, 1994, p. 206). In 1991, Slovenia developed 
a number of new laws in order to establish economic institutions (Sachs & Pleskovic, 1994, p. 199). 
It appears that Slovenia did develop its formal institutions throughout the transition period and 
began development before the oﬃ  cial transition beginning. However, near the end of the transition, 
institutional reform was slowing down, and this can be seen by the negative assessment of its 
institutions at the beginning of the EU accession. This suggests a slight deviation from the gradualist 
model.
The neoclassical gradualist model states that companies should face hard budget constraints 
from year three. An independent central bank should also be established during the third year 
of the transition (Marangos, 2005a, p. 286) mainly to control inﬂ ation. The Bank of Slovenia, the 
state’s central bank, was established during the ﬁ rst year of transition. This is much earlier than the 
suggestion of the gradualist model and is actually identical to the shock therapy model.  In terms of 
budget constraints, there is general agreement that soft budget constraints did exist, particularly at 
the beginning of transition.
Slovenia appeared to allow soft budget constraints for most companies, therefore, deviating 
signiﬁ cantly from the gradualist model. Towards the later phase of transition (nearing year 6), farmers 
faced increasingly harder budget constraints, but these too were compensated by comparatively large 
operational faming subsidies (slight deviation from the model).
The neoclassical gradualists believe, similarly to the shock therapy model, that the tax structure 
should be neutral (i.e. regressive, not progressive) and the government budgets should be balanced 
(Marangos, 2006, p. 145). According to Marangos, a tax system should be put into place within the ﬁ rst 
two years of transition (as opposed to the shock therapy prescription of 1 year), and budgets should 
be balanced during the whole transition period (Marangos, 2005a, p. 286).
According to the World Bank indicator ‘Central government deﬁ cit and ﬁ nancing (% of GDP) cash 
surplus/deﬁ cit’, Slovenia’s budget deﬁ cit rarely dropped below 2% of its GDP. A large budget deﬁ cit of 
8.3% was recorded in 1995, after which the budget deﬁ cit remained between 1-4%. The Slovenian tax 
system was formed in 1990, when personal income taxes and corporate income taxes were introduced 
(Majcen, Verbič, Bayar, & Čok, 2009, p. 1). The income tax was initially very progressive. This system 
was modiﬁ ed in 2004, when the number of tax brackets was reduced to a total of 5, and the lowest 
marginal tax rate was reduced from 17% to 16% (Klun, 2009, p. 223). The VAT system was adopted only in 
1999. This demonstrates that changes took place in taxation throughout the whole transition period, 
and the tax system was not set up within 2 years as the gradualist model prescribes.
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The neoclassical gradualists believe that a pegged exchange rate should be used initially, after 
which a ﬂ exible ﬂ oating exchange rate should be established in the 9th or 10th year (Marangos, 2006, 
p. 145). They also supported the idea of conditional foreign aid during the whole transition process. 
Tariﬀ s are allowed and supported during the ﬁ rst 8 years of transition, after which these should be 
gradually removed (Marangos, 2006; Stiglitz, 2002; Dewatripont & Roland, 1992).
Slovenia established its own currency the tolar in 1991, similarly to Estonia, and it bypassed the 
pegged exchange rate step and started using the ﬂ oating exchange rate mechanism from the beginning 
(Feldmann, 2006, p. 846). Similarly to Estonia, Slovenia acted against the advice of the IMF in setting 
up its own currency so quickly. Accordingly, Slovenia deviated clearly from the gradualist model, in 
skipping the 9-10 years of advised pegged exchange rate. In this respect, Slovenia was even more rapid 
in its reforms than even what the shock therapy model would expect.
To summarise, although Slovenia followed the gradualist model in maintaining some tariﬀ s during 
the ﬁ rst 8 years of transition, it dropped more than 50% of its tariﬀ s within the ﬁ rst 6 years. This suggests 
a signiﬁ cant deviation from the gradualist model’s advice of holding tariﬀ s high for 9-10 years.
In terms of foreign borrowing, Slovenia took loans from the IMF and WB, beginning only in 1993. 
This marks a slight deviation from the gradualist model.
The neoclassical gradualist model expects a wider safety net to be available for all residents than 
it is expected in the shock therapy model, but one that would be available for a limited amount of 
time to prevent dependence (Marangos, 2006, p. 146). Compared to the shock therapy model, private 
providers should be allowed on the market after year 3 of transition.
Slovenia was noted to have maintained a comparatively large social safety net in place after 
transition. For example, its unemployment and poverty rates were both below the EU average, which is 
unusual for a transitioning country. Similarly, its expenditure as a percentage of GDP was comparable 
to the EU average, again unusual for a transitioning country (Šušteršič, 2009, p. 270). Feldmann has 
also indicated on the overall generous redistribution, public works, and retraining and welfare programs 
(Feldmann, 2006, p. 846).
In terms of using private providers of welfare, Slovenia has made signiﬁ cant progress in the 
privatisation of social welfare, especially in health care. According to Istenic (1998), before 1992, there 
were no private funds for ﬁ nancing health care services at all. The health care reform in 1992 introduced 
an additional, voluntary private health insurance pillar, which almost became quasi-mandatory as its 
coverage became nearly universal (Mrak, Rojec, & Silva-Jauregui, 2004). Therefore, Slovenia deviated 
slightly in allowing its private providers to enter the market a little earlier (year 2 as opposed to 3) of 
the transition process.
To conclude: out of a total of 16 reform items in Slovenia, eleven deviated signiﬁ cantly from the 
shock therapy model, ﬁ ve deviated slightly and no reform items matched the gradualist model. A 
corresponding comparison of 15 Estonian reforms to the gradualist model showed that ten reform 
items deviated signiﬁ cantly, four deviated slightly and one matched the model. This suggests that the 
Slovenian example did not reﬂ ect the gradualist model particularly well, however, it did not reﬂ ect the 
shock therapy model particularly well either.
Are Estonia and Slovenia matching the theoretical models?
According to the research results, on the ﬁ rst level of analysis both test cases yielded similar results, 
as 53% and 69% of the analysed reforms deviated signiﬁ cantly from the models they were supposed to 
symbolise; in addition, 25-31% of the reform items deviated slightly from their ideal models, and only 
0-20% of reform items did not deviate from their ideal models. The summarised results indicated that 
the reforms undertaken in Estonia and Slovenia bear low resemblance to the theoretical models they 
are supposed to support (33% and 16% respectively). 
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The similarity with which the reforms in Estonia and Slovenia correspond to their opposing 
models (31% and 20% respectively) is even more striking. This makes Estonia look almost as good of 
an example of gradualism as it is an example of shock therapy, and Slovenia appears almost as good 
of an example of shock therapy as it is an example of gradualism.
On the second level of analysis (percentage match to the model), the score was calculated on 
the basis of alternative weights for each of the three categories, where signiﬁ cant deviations were 
given a small weight of 25% (as an inverse of 75% deviated, which is the median of 50-100% deviated). 
According to the research, overall results and conclusions remained similar: reforms in Estonia 
and Slovenia had low resemblance to the theoretical models they were supposed to illustrate (48% 
and 37% respectively). Estonia and Slovenia once again showed high similarities to their so-called 
counterpart models (46% and 39% respectively). This suggests that regardless of which scoring system 
is used, Marangos’ models are not able to accurately separate Estonia as shock therapy and Slovenia as 
gradualism. The alternative possibility is that Marango’s model is generally accurate, but CEE reforms 
in 1991-2000 were exceptionally similar when evaluated on a broader scale.
On the third level of analysis, which targeted 14 reform elements, each rated independently by 
asking, Does this reform element correctly identify that Estonia looks more like shock therapy, and Slovenia 
more like gradualism? (scored +1) or, Does this reform element make Estonia look more like gradualism and 
Slovenia more like shock therapy? (scored -1). The total aggregate score for the 14 reform elements was 
-1.5. This suggests that the reform elements are slightly more likely to classify the country cases into 
the ‘wrong’ model, but overall they have very little power to diﬀ erentiate the Estonian and Slovenian 
cases into any model.
As the comparison shows, there were only seven instances (out of 62) when the actual practice 
matched the model within a 25% error margin. Most of these describe Estonia, where three items 
were well matched with shock therapy (income policy, tariﬀ s, foreign aid) and three to gradualism 
(independent central bank, foreign borrowing, and foreign aid).
Five out of 16 reform items proved to be explanatory in deciding whether a country’s case is more 
similar to the shock therapy or gradualist model. The remaining ten items provided no additional 
discriminatory power. The ﬁ ve most explanatory variables were: price deregulation (the analysis of 
which portrayed Estonia as slightly more inclined towards shock therapy), income policy (portrayed 
Estonia as slightly more shock therapy biased and Slovenia as slightly more gradualist), independent 
central bank (portrayed Estonia as signiﬁ cantly more gradualist and Slovenia as signiﬁ cantly more 
inclined towards shock therapy), tariﬀ s (portrayed Estonia as signiﬁ cantly more shock therapy 
centred), and exchange rate (portrayed Slovenia as slightly more shock therapy biased).
Only one item out of 16 provided discriminant validity (income policy), in that it ‘correctly’ allocated 
Slovenia to the gradualist model and Estonia to the shock therapy model, despite slight deviations in 
both cases. The apparent failure of the other 15 items to provide any discriminate validity supports 
the general conclusions above and suggests that Marangos’ models have low potential for correctly 
allocating the CEE country examples in 1991-2000 to the shock therapy and gradualist models.
It is not surprising that there are visible diﬀ erences between theory and practice, particularly 
as theoretical assumptions are quite narrowly deﬁ ned. Furthermore, the starting positions of the 
transition countries diﬀ ered; what could be considered shock therapy (price liberalisation, for 
example) in some countries was part of initial conditions in another. In reality, the changes were a 
rather inconsistent combination of shock therapy and gradualism, both in the changes of economic 
systems or in economic policies, which depended very much on current political elites and randomly 
chosen foreign advisers.
Marangos’ model seems methodologically too general to diversify diﬀ erent cases of the CEE 
transition process, where most of the countries found themselves in a similar transition paradigm, 
based on values of ‘Reagonomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’. In this transition model, the shock therapy 
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appeared to be a basic matrix for values, and gradualism was forced by the practical circumstances, 
where despite political rhetoric countries needed similar reforms, which were in most cases possible 
within a similar timeframe.
Accordingly, the conceptual model and operationalisation used by Marangos provides more 
theoretical clarity than practical ability to explain the transition process logic in practical testing. In 
the cases of Estonia and Slovenia, the weakness of Marangos’ model appeared in its disability to adapt 
to a starting situation, where the ﬁ rst reforms were conducted inside the federal union but continued 
later independently. This additional variable caused a situation, where both states were restricted 
by the central authorities to conduct key reforms in the ﬁ rst years of transition (currency reform, 
privatisation, etc.). As a result, test states received numerous minus points in terms of Marangos’ 
checklist, since they were unable to conduct the necessary reforms according to their ideal model. 
Accordingly, in this aspect both concepts and their criteria need further development to be useful in 
practical testing, as also upcoming transition processes may occur in former federal unions. 
Table 1: Estonian and Slovenian reform items compared to the shock therapy model and gradualist 
model
 Indicator
Estonia 
vs. shock 
therapy
Estonia vs 
gradualism
Slovenia vs 
gradualism
Slovenia 
vs shock 
therapy
Average
Number of reform items that deviated 
signiﬁ cantly (>50%) from the model
8 9 11 10 10
Number of reform items that deviated 
slightly (25-50%) from the model
4 4 5 4 5
Number of reform items that matched 
the model (<25% deviation) 
3 3 0 1 2
Percentage of reform items that deviated 
signiﬁ cantly (>50%) from the model
53% 56% 69% 67% 61%
Percentage of reform items that deviated 
slightly (25-50%) from the model
27% 25% 31% 27% 29%
Percentage of reform items that matched 
the model (<25% deviation) 
20% 19% 0% 7% 10%
Weighted matching score (=signiﬁ cant 
deviations* 0)
0 0 0 0
Weighted matching score (=signiﬁ cant 
deviations* 0.5)
2 2 2,5 2
Weighted matching score (=signiﬁ cant 
deviations* 1)
3 3 0 1
Total weighted
score
5 5 2.5 3
Number of reform items (maximum 
weighted score)
15 16 16 15
Percentage match to model
(Total score/maximum weighted score
33% 31% 16% 20% 24%
Source: author’s compilation
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Conclusions
This article has had two main goals, closely interlinked with each other. The ﬁ rst task was to analyse 
whether the reform paths undertaken by Estonia and Slovenia followed the theoretical concepts of 
‘shock therapy’ and ‘gradualism’, the models the states are often symbolising in theoretical debates. 
The second task was to evaluate the ability of the theoretical models to correctly allocate the classical 
country examples to the shock therapy and gradualist models.
The study results related to the ﬁ rst question indicated that most of the reforms (50-70%) in 
Estonia and Slovenia deviated signiﬁ cantly from the ideals set by the theoretical models. A more 
complex analysis showed that Estonia corresponded to the shock therapy model by 33% and the 
gradualist model by 31%. Slovenia corresponded to the gradualist model by 16% and the shock therapy 
model by 20%. Only one reform out of sixteen correctly identiﬁ ed Estonia as representative of the 
shock therapy model and Slovenia as gradualist. This suggests that according to the theoretical model, 
Estonia appeared to be just as gradualist as it is a follower of shock therapy, and Slovenia is just as 
shock therapy inclined as it is gradualist. This conclusion brings into question the utility of the current 
‘models of transition’ framework and calls for a substantially more nuanced one to replace it.
Of course, it is quite risky to argue that Estonian and Slovenian transition models are similar. 
There are many gradualist elements in the Estonian transition and other authors may have supporting 
arguments for opposite conclusions. The key question is the measurement methodology and validity 
that produced these unexpected results.  Accordingly, either the measurement tools oﬀ ered by 
Marangos were not suﬃ  cient for clear diﬀ erentiation or the cases actually were similar. Marangos’ 
model tends to sacriﬁ ce its explanatory ability to its simplicity and, in some aspects, mechanical logic. 
This leads the authors to the conclusion that Marangos’ models of shock therapy and gradualism 
have poor potential for correctly allocating the CEE country examples to the shock therapy and 
gradualist models. These transition models, which might be accurate to evaluate and explain a wider 
selection of transition cases, seem methodologically too general to diversify diﬀ erent cases of the CEE 
transition process, where most of the countries found themselves in a similar transition paradigm. 
In the Slovenian case, the criteria for Marangos’ gradualist model were not fulﬁ lled, while compared 
with the rest of the CEE countries during the period of 1991-2000, Slovenia was in many aspects one 
of the most careful, gradual and slowest reformers.  In the case of Estonia, the criteria of Marangos’ 
shock therapy model were also not met, and Estonia also did not follow the classical Polish shock 
therapy path, but at the same time, in many aspects Estonia’s reforms were among the fastest and 
most radical in the CEE (privatisation, pension reform, currency reform, etc.)
What would be the probable solutions to overcoming the weaknesses of these theoretical models? 
Combining diﬀ erent models of transition would be one possible solution to raising the explanatory 
ability in practical cases. The current study additionally pointed out some critical aspects to be reﬁ ned 
in future concepts of shock therapy and gradualism: a) a necessity to deﬁ ne central variables and 
initial conditions that inﬂ uence the transition process; b) description and deﬁ nitions of reforms 
(reform packages) that are best matched to the initial conditions and the overall logic of the model; c) 
mapping the speciﬁ c trajectories, paths and patterns taken by countries in transition. With the next 
level concepts, more focus and consideration should be given to the relative importance, weighing or 
even omission of reform items.
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